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Abstract
Since several decades, information and communication technologies (ICT) as well as new
organizational designs change the working life in firms. Using nationally representative
Swiss firm-level panel data, the present paper analyzes the relationship between these deve-
lopments and examines, whether ICT is associated with centralization or decentralization
tendencies. The results suggest a positive impact of ICT on the degree of delegation.
Furthermore, the diffusion of ICT use within the workforce and the intensity of ICT
investments are essential for the decentralization effect of ICT. Thus, reduced agency costs
owing to ICT use result in decentralized decision-making authorities in Swiss firms. The
results are robust to potential endogeneity biases like reversed causality and unobserved
firm characteristics.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, working life has undergone tremendous changes. These changes are
promoted largely by (1) the introduction of information and communication technologies
(ICT) and (2) new organizational designs. By now, ICT has become an essential part
of working life. Applications like email, internet, digital assistants or computer based
production technologies are self-evident for most employees. In the last decades, huge
investments in ICT in Switzerland as well as worldwide can be observed (Arvanitis (2005)).
According to the sample of the present paper, in 2008 98,9% of all interviewed Swiss firms
report that they use computers; in average 19% of their whole gross investments are
invested in ICT. These innovations have revolutionized the way how work is done and
partly influence productivity1.
In addition to the appearance of ICT, a trend concerning the organizational architecture
of firms has also profound effects on work life: Different authors ascertain a restructuring
from Tayloristic to so-called Holistic work organization. Clearly and narrowly-defined
decision-making authorities and centralization are replaced by multitasking and decen-
tralization (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Lindbeck and Snower (2000)). This ”new firm
model” (Arvanitis (2005)) is characterized by an increased use of team work and job ro-
tation, a decrease of the number of managerial levels and more direct participation in
decision-making (Lindbeck and Snower (2000)). In 2008 69% of all asked Swiss firms
declare that they use continuing teams, which handle task areas corporately or discuss
topics. After all, 19% declare to use programs for job rotation. The consequential decen-
tralized responsibility necessitates continuous learning and development from employees
and requires better skills2.
The simultaneous development of ICT use and organizational change suggests the ques-
tion, whether there exists a relationship between both evolutions. The approaches to
investigate a relationship between ICT and the allocation of decision rights are numerous.
In this context several authors argue that ICT supports centralization (e.g., Leavitt and
Whisler (1958), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)), others argue that ICT promotes de-
centralization (e.g., Radner (1993), Wyner and Malone (1996)). Basically, the use of ICT
1Studies which analyze productivity effects of ICT are for example of Black and Lynch (2001), Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (2000), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Hempell (2005) or Zammuto and O’Connor (1992).
2The skill-biased organizational change is examined for example in the studies of Beckmann (2004),
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) or Caroli, Greenan and Guel-
lec (2001).
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lowers on the one hand decision information costs, which favors centralization, but enables
on the other hand decentralization by decreasing agency costs. The resulting allocation of
decision-making authority depends on the question, which effect outbalances when using
ICT.
The present study analyzes whether ICT is associated with centralization or decentral-
ization tendencies in firms. For the analysis, two surveys from the KOF Swiss Economic
Institute (KOF) from the ETH Zurich are used. They are a nationally representative
sample for the Swiss private business sector. From these waves a panel dataset with two
periods including firms with at least 20 employees is built.
Contrary to several previous studies, the data allow to explicitely separate between cen-
tralization and decentralization tendencies. Former studies often focus on the general rela-
tionship of ICT with organizational structure (e.g., Heintze and Bretschneider (2000)). In
addition, a large scale representative data set including all firm sizes and business sectors
is used for the present study in contrast to several papers which are constrained to specific
industries or firms (e.g., Greenan (2003) and Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997)). Finally,
the ICT variables used in this study picture diverse ICT characteristics and therefore offer
a broader view of ICT use in firms. This allows to differentiate between single effects of
diverse ICT characteristics.
When examining the impact of ICT on the allocation of decision rights, there are especially
two sources for potential estimation biases: First, the firms organizational structure may
be an enabler for the use of ICT. For example, a decentralized allocation of decision rights
may help to exploit the advantages of emailing because employees may communicate
directly. This could increase the share of employees who use emailing. In order to avoid
this problem of reversed causality, the ICT variables are lagged. They come from the
survey which was conducted three years before. Second, unobservable firm characteristics,
which are not captured by the controls, but which are correlated with the allocation of
decision-making authority and ICT, may lead to estimation biases. For example, a type
of managers may have a preference to try innovations and therefore introduces ICT and
decentralizes the decision-making authorities. To the best of the author’s knowledge, in
the relevant literature reversed causality and unobserved firm characteristics are until now
only considered in the studies of Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2009).
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Therefore the methodological procedure of this paper is as follows: In a first step, a
pooled cross sectional OLS model is estimated. Using the panel structure of the data, in
the next step random and fixed effects models are used. Since these estimation models
are not always unproblematic, Mundlak’s (1978) approach is additionally applied as a
compromise.
The paper proceeds in the following way: In the second chapter the theoretical background
is presented. Afterwards different empirical studies concerning the research question are
shown in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces the data, variables and descriptive statistics
of the econometric analyses, followed by a description of the econometric approaches-
applied in this paper. The results of these models are presented in detail in the following
subsection. The paper is finished by a conclusion in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 ICT and the Allocation of Decision-Making Authorities
From a theoretical perspective it is argued on the one hand, that there is a causal rela-
tionship between ICT and organizational architecture. On the other hand, a relationhsip
between these aspects is disputed. According to the first approach, it is assumed that
the use of ICT leads to a change in organizational architecture (e.g., Huber (1990)). This
view was firstly argued in organizational research like contingency theory or work of the
Aston group3. According to this so-called ”technological determinism” (Greenan (2003))
or ”technological imperative” (George and King (1991)) both a fostering of centralization
and decentralization is possible. The argumentation why the causality goes in this direc-
tion is mainly based on the fact that indeed the prices for ICT have fallen dramatically in
the past decades (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)). However,
there is no evidence for a similar fall in the price for organizational changes (Hempell and
Zwick (2008)). Consequently, the decline in the price for ICT resulted in a simultaneous
3According to contingency theory, the optimal allocation of decision rights - or in general organizational
design - is contingent on internal and external determinants. Supporters from the contingency theory (e.g.,
Blau et al. (1976), Marsh and Mannari (1981), Woodward (1981)) and the Aston group (e.g., Child and
Mansfield (1972), Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey (1969)) argue for a causal relationship from technology
to organizational structure. In contrast to maintainers of contingency theory, the Aston group found a
stronger relationship of size than of technology with the organizational structure.
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development of ICT use and reorganization (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)).
Aligned with an increasing use of ICT, costs for coordination, communication and infor-
mation processing have fallen intensely ( Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Malone (1997)).
Thus, ICT is seen as an enabler for the introduction of advanced organizational structure
and practices (Malone (1997), Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997)).
Second, some authors argue that there is no inherent relationship at all between ICT
and organizational change. Thus, both developed simultaneously due to the influence of
other factors like the internal and external economic structure of a firm (e.g., a challeng-
ing environment) or the nature of the task environment (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998),
Delehanty (1967), George and King (1991), Myers (1966), Robey (1977)). Also, instead
of a single reaction to ICT, a range of management effects could appear and other factors
determine the relationship eventually (Attewell and Rule (1984)).
2.2 Centralization versus Decentralization Tendencies
In this section the focus lies on the expected impact of ICT on organizational design. More
precisely, it is examined whether ICT is more likely to foster centralization or decentra-
lization. ICT influences the components of internal coordination costs in firms. Internal
coordination costs accrue due to self-interested preferences of the principal and the agent
(Jensen and Meckling (1976), Alchian and Demsetz (1972)). These costs contain agency
costs, like monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual costs. Furthermore, they consist
of decision information costs like information processing costs (for communication and
documentation) and opportunity costs resulting from poor information (Gurbaxani and
Whang (1991)). ICT reduce both decision information and agency costs.
On the one hand, ICT decreases decision information costs and thus fosters centraliza-
tion. This centralization effect occurs in different ways (e.g., Leavitt and Whisler (1958),
Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)): Firstly, the intense reduction of information and com-
munication costs leads to a transformation of specific into general information (Jensen
and Meckling (1992)). As a result, it is possible for the principal to monitor managers
and to coordinate activities made by peripheral teams (Colombo and Delmastro (2004))
at low costs. He can examine work results from lower level managers via expert systems
as well as give orders using ICT. Less inefficiencies in the communication process and
lower information costs are therefore expected to lead to a more centralized allocation
of tasks and decision making (Radner (1993)). Furthermore, because a larger amount of
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information is more simply and faster available, the top management is less dependent on
middle-managers and reduces its number. As a consequence, ICT makes centralization
easier and the allocation of decision rights is centralized in the top management (Leavitt
and Whisler (1958)). These arguments can be combined as the decision information costs
effect.
On the other hand, ICT also decreases agency costs and therefore makes decentralization
more beneficial. Different relations may lead to this effect (e.g., Radner (1993), Wyner
and Malone (1996)): Firstly, employees and lower level managers gain access to infor-
mation which were reserved to the principal so far. This enables the employees to make
decisions independently. It also motivates them to show more initiative and higher effort.
Secondly, the principal has the ability to monitor the agent indirectly via computer (Hub-
bard (2000)). Thus, he can delegate decisions but is anyway able to control the agent and
to intervene potentially in critical situations. Lastly, ICT reduces also the costs for lateral
communication between agents. This allows them to work in teams. Thus, ICT lowers
communication and transaction costs (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)) and therefore allows
the use of more multitasking and decentralization (Lindbeck and Snower (2000)). ICT
helps to introduce flexibility in firms (Lucas and Baroudi (1994)). These lines of arguments
can be integrated as the agency costs effect of ICT on the allocation of decision-making
authority.
Thus, the use of ICT leads both to a reduction of decision information and agency costs.
The resulting allocation of decision-making authority depends on the role of local infor-
mation as well as on the cost structure of the individual firm. If local information is
highly important, a principal will delegate decisions to the agent instead of communi-
cating, as long as the incentive problem is small (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994),
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Dessein (2002), Hart and Moore (2005)). Hereby, finally
a trade-off arises, which is known as the dilemma of organizational theory (e.g., Aghion
and Tirole (1997), Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), Mookherjee (2006)).
According to the cost structure of the individual firm, the degree of delegation should be
located, where the sum of agency and decision information costs is minimized (Gurbax-
ani and Whang (1991)). To put it another way, if through ICT the relevant information
increase quality and speed of top management decisions, centralization results. On the
contrary, decision rights get more decentralized when ICT improves the opportunity to
supervise employees and reduces agency costs (Gurbaxani and Whang (1991)).
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Combining different lines of argumentation two hypotheses can be derived. According
to the first hypothesis the decision information costs effect outweighs the agency costs
effect when ICT is used, which results in centralized decision-making authority. Here we
would expect a negative impact of ICT on the allocation of decision-making authority.
In contrast, corresponding to the second hypothesis, ICT leads to more delegation and
decentralization when the agency costs effect outweighs the decision information costs
effect.
Since the theoretical predictions on the relationship between ICT and the allocation of
decision rights are not unambigious, the objective of the present paper is to examine
empirically whether ICT is associated with centralization or decentralization tendencies
in firms. The following section contains the related empirical literature on this issue.
3 Related Literature
Empirical investigations related to the research question can be separated in three areas.
Studies from the first area generally look at the relationship between ICT and organiza-
tional structure. The type of structure is not taken into account. Empirical investigations
from the second area, which is the largest one, explicitely focus on whether ICT is re-
lated to centralization or decentralization tendencies. Finally, the third area contains
studies which look seperately on the effects of different kinds of ICT on centralization or
decentralization.
Studies from the first area analyze generally whether there exists a relationship between
ICT and the firm organization. This research question was at first examined using cor-
relations (e.g., Pfeffer and Leblebici (1977)) and case studies. Foster and Flynn (1984)
adopt the perspective that information technology effects organizational roles and tasks
in the case of General Motors. The technology-structure relationship is also observed in
a study from Carter (1984) who analyzes the effects of computerization on the structure
of newspaper organizations. The impact depends on the used task, where organizational
size serves as a moderator variable. Burnes (1988) uses case studies of nine engineering
companies for his analysis and concludes, that CNC4 machine tools do not determine job
design.
4CNC: Computer numerically controlled
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After examining the relationship of ICT and organizational design primarily with case
studies, first regression results are achieved. Kelley (1990) finds that technology is only
one of a number of determinants of job design. The author carries out a multivariate
regression analysis using a national survey of 506 production managers. Heintze and
Bretschneider (2000) find in their examination of public agencies using two-stage least
square regressions only little impact of IT on an agency’s structure.
Empirical literature from the second area relates to studies, which explicitely distin-
guish between centralization or decentralization tendencies associated with ICT. In this
range, several studies are focused on specific industries. Wijnberg, van den Ende and de
Wit (2002) implement two case studies in the financial sector to analyze the impact of
new IT on the involvement of employees and find mixed results.
Three further studies concentrate on manufacturing. In a Danish case study AMT5 is seen
as an enabler of group-based work organization, but a number of other factors also influ-
ence organizational changes (Sun and Gertsen (1995)). Gupta, Chen and Chiang (1997)
observe a positive interaction of AMT with decentralization. The interaction of formaliza-
tion and mechanistic structures is negatively related to AMT. Greenan (2003) conducts
an exploration of the relationship between technological and organizational change with
correlations. She uses the survey on organizational changes in the manufacturing industry
(Changement Organisationnel) conducted in 1993 by SESSI and INSEE, which is repre-
sentative of 1824 firms with more than 50 employees in manufacturing.6 Variables related
to technological change concern the use of computer-aided systems like CAPC, CADM,
CASC or CAMM, networked and non-networked NCMT as well as robots.7 For the or-
ganizational change information about decentralization, integration, increased technical
expertise, off-line groups, autonomous work groups and delayering is used. The findings
show on the whole positive correlations between different types of technological change
and reorganizations.
Several other studies include different sectors in its analysis. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997)
use data from several sources: Data about IT and technology use are from the Com-
puter Intelligence Corporation Installation database telephone surveys. Human Resource
5AMT: Advanced manufacturing technology
6SESSI: the statistical agency of the French ministry of industry, INSEE: the French national statistical
agency
7CADM: computer-aided design and manufacture, CAPC: computer-aided production control, CASC:
computer-aided stock control, CAMM: computer-aided maintenance management, NCMT: numerically
controlled machine tools
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practices are obtained from an own telephone survey including 273 firms. Lastly, the
Compustat data delivers additional firm information. The four measures for IT are the
total capital stock of IT, the total central processing power in millions of instructions
per second, the number of PCs, the number of local area network nodes and a five point
measure of computerization of the workplace gained from the HR survey. Furthermore,
the authors distinguish between structural and individual decentralization. The first mea-
sure of decentralization is expressed by self-managing teams, employee involvement groups
and broad jobs. The second one, individual decentralization, relates to the pace and the
method of work. Additionally, composite variables of those measures are built. Control-
ling for production worker occupation and firm size, conditional Spearman rank order
correlations between organizational change and IT measures are calculated. The authors
find significant correlations, which are consistent across industries and variation measures.
In the case firms invest in ICT, they use also a system of decentralized authority and
connected practices.
In a further study the authors expand their analysis in both data and methods (Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (1998)). Additionally to the previous project, information about firm
performance (panel data from Compustat), investments in training, education, incentives
and promotion criteria (obtained from an own survey) are gathered. Most analyses are
made using a sample size of 379 firms. Beyond their previous study, the authors estimate
demand equations for IT because they assume organizational change as exogenous deter-
minant of IT. Interpreting the coefficients as demand elasticities, the authors find that
decentralized firms have a higher demand for IT and increase their demand for IT at a
faster rate than centralized firms.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) are primarily interested in skill-biased organizational change
in British and French establishments. But also the impact of ICT on organizational change
is considered. Data about British firms come from the pooled British Workplace Industrial
Relations Surveys from 1984 and 1990. Additional information about earnings, educa-
tion and occupation are gained from the General Household survey. The French data is
built of four different data sources8. For Britain, the dependent variable is a dummy for
whether the establishment has introduced organizational change over the past three years,
for France whether the plant had introduced delayering between 1989 and 1992. The
main explaining variables are a dummy for whether the plant has introduced new plant
8Relations Professionnelles et Ne´gociations d’Entreprise (RESPONSE) for organizational methods like
delayering, ESE for the employment structure, Enqueˆte Emploi for population information and Bilans
Industriels et Commerciaux for firm-level data like capital stock or value added
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machinery or equipment that includes new micro-electronic technology over the previous
three years (Britain) and the proportion of workers using new technologies (France). The
authors carry out a probit maximum likelihood regression with 1674 respectively 1014
observations. They find that in Britain technical change is strongly correlated with or-
ganizational change, in contrast to France. But here high-tech firms rather change their
organizational structure.
In a study conducted by Acemoglu et al. (2007) three datasets from British and French
establishments are used for probit maximum likelihood estimations. Measures for decen-
tralization are organization into profit centres, decentralization of investment decisions
and delayering. In order to account for reversed causality, the exogenous variables are
lagged. The authors find that firms closer to the technological frontier are more decen-
tralized. Insofar as in the present study the ICT variables are also lagged, the proceeding
is similar to the study of Acemoglu et al. (2007).
Finally, the third kind of studies does not only observe centralization or decentralization
tendencies, but also examines whether the effect varies with the kind of ICT. Pinsonneault
and Kraemer (1997) use hierarchical regressions to analyze data from 155 city governments.
The dependent variable is the number of middle managers divided by the total number of
managers; the independent variables are four indices of the extent of automation concern-
ing control, coordination, efficiency, and access. Computing decision authority serves as a
moderator; organization size is a control variable. According to the authors, in centralized
organizations IT is associated with a lower ratio of middle managers, in decentralized with
a higher one. The results also indicate that different types of IT exert various influences
on the ratio of middle managers. IT focused on coordination is associated with a lower
number of middle managers whereas IT used as a monitoring device involves a higher
ratio. The effect of IT, which aims at gaining efficiency, is not clear and depends on the
role middle managers play in the organization. By and large, the authors interpret their
results as a support for the reinforcement politics perspective, where the influences of IT
are contingent upon the structural arrangements of the organization and the congruence
between these structures.
Bloom et al. (2009) use in their working paper data from the Center for Economic Perfor-
mance Management and Organization Survey and the Harte-Hanks ICT panel, comple-
mented by external data sources. Estimating OLS and probit maximum likelihood models,
they find that information and communication technologies exercise different effects on firm
organization. While information technologies lower information costs and therefore enable
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delegation, a lower degree of communication costs fosters centralization. As proxies for
better information technology, they use Enterprise Resource Planning for plant managers
and CAD/CAM for production workers. The use of data networks stands for decreas-
ing communication costs. The authors take into account potential endogeneity: In an
extending equation, a country-level network price variable is regressed on plant manager
autonomy. The coefficient shows the expected positive sign. Insofar as Bloom et al. (2009)
distinguish between different forms of ICT, the present investigation is related to their
paper. However, they divide ICT in information and communication technologies. In
contrast, the present paper looks at different characteristics of ICT.
To sum, the results concerning the relationship between ICT and organizational change are
in general quite mixed. Note that several of the above mentioned studies are restricted to
specific industries or firms. This restrains to draw general conclusions. Also much empir-
ical work analyzes the research question using correlations or OLS regressions. Reversed
causality or unobserved firm characteristics as sources for potential estimation biases are
predominantly not considered.
The innovation of the present paper can therefore be summarized as follows: First, the
paper jointly analyzes the research questions of the above demonstrated areas. It examines
whether there exists a relationship between ICT and organizational change at all. It also
proofs, whether ICT is associated with centralization or decentralization tendencies in
firms. Additionally, the single effects of different ICT measures are observed. Second,
the nationally representative data used in this paper contain information about diverse
industries in contrast to several previous studies, which focused on one industry or firm.
This allows a wider perspective on the use of ICT. Finally, in contrast to most previous
studies, the potential sources of estimation biases reversed causality and unobserved firm
characteristics are taken into account in the present paper.
4 Empirical Investigation
4.1 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics
For the empirical investigation panel data from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (KOF)
from the ETH Zurich are used. The KOF conducts regularly nationally representative
surveys for the privated business sector containing comprehensive questions about firm
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characteristics. The sample of the KOF is based on the business census and is broken
down according to sectors and size categories specific to each sector. For the present
analysis, the waves 2005 and 2008 from the survey ”Innovation Activities, Information
Technologies and Work Organization” offer questions which are particularly well appro-
priate for the adaptation of the research question. Questions concerning the ICT use of
firms can additionally be used from the wave 2000 of the survey ”Organizational Change
and the Adoption of Information and Communication Technologies”. The surveys offer
especially for ICT a more versatile data base than comparable surveys in other countries.
The analysis is restricted to firms with at least 20 employees because only they are asked
questions concerning the allocation of decision rights.
The dependent variable refers to the allocation of decision rights at work. Seven questions
relate to the allocation of competences within the firm defined on a five-point Likert scale.
They cover different areas of the distribution of competences between supervisor and
associate. One question is for example ”Who decides on the pace of work?”. Response
categories range from ”associate alone” to ”supervisor alone”. All questions concerning
competence distribution may be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. They are used to
build the index variable delegation by transforming the response categories to 0 to 4,
adding up the responses and dividing by 28, by what the variable is normed between 0
and 1. A firm with a value of delegation closer to one therefore has a more decentralized
allocation of decision-making authority and vice versa.
A wide range of questions is related to the application of ICT. Different ICT variables are
used in order to gain a comprehensive picture of the ICT use in each firm. The first variable
is built in the following way: Firms are asked whether or not they use a digital assistant
(organizer, PDA, etc.), laptop, internet, local area network, EDI, intranet, extranet or
website. These binary variables are added up to build the variable ict, which reflects the
diversity of ICT use. In three further questions the share of employees who use computers,
internet and intranet is asked. There are six different response categories which begin with
0% and move up in steps of 20% until a share of 100% is reached. The responses of these
three questions are again added up in order to get the variable ictshare, which serves
as an indicator for the diffusion of the use of computers, internet and intranet. Finally,
investments in ICT per capita (Acemoglu et al. (2007)) are calculated by the following
equation (1):
ictpc = (invest ∗ ictinvest)/L, (1)
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where overall investments (invest) are multiplied with the share of ICT investments as part
of the overall investments (ictinvest) in the last three years and divided by the number of
employees working in the firm (L). This variable serves as an indicator for the intensity of
ICT investments. Unfortunately, it cannot be lagged due to lack of data in 2000.
The information of these single variables is combined to get two comprehensive ICT mea-
sures which cover various characteristics of ICT use. Therefore, the variable stdict is built
by standardizing the sum of the standardized single ICT variables (Bresnahan, Brynjolf-
sson and Hitt (2002)):
stdict = std(std(ict) + std(ictshare) + std(ictpc)). (2)
In order to get a further exogenous variable, the share of employees which uses computers
is applied instead of the combination of computer, internet and intranet use. The variable
stdictcompu is then composed again through standardizing the sum of the standardized
components ict, compushare and ictpc, as shown in equation (3):
stdictcompu = std(std(ict) + std(compushare) + std(ictpc)). (3)
The resulting variables stdict and stdictcompu cover different aspects and offer therefore
a comprehensive picture of the diversity, diffusion and intensity of ICT use in each firm.
A bunch of control variables accounts for observed heterogeneity between the firms. The
log of sales of the firm in Switzerland (lnY ) and the log of gross investments (lnK ) are
explanatory variables (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998), Caroli and Van Reenen (2001)). Ac-
cording to the existing literature, larger firms tend towards more decentralization (e.g.,
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), Colombo and Delmastro (2004)). Therefore also the log
of the number of employees including apprentices (lnL) is inserted in all equations. Fur-
thermore, younger firms are expected to rather have a decentralized work organization
(Acemoglu et al. 2007). That is why the founding year (fyear) is another variable. A
dummy variable which takes the value 1 for firms which have a foreign (non domestic)
owner and 0, otherwise (foreign) is inserted to catch the potential effect of a more complex
production process (Acemoglu et al. (2007)). More competitive environments are expected
to bring forward decentralized structures (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2007), Ichniowski and
Shaw (1995), OECD (1999), Osterman (1994)). That is why the share of exports as a
percentage of sales (exportshare) is a further control variable.
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Because advanced work organization is often associated with a well educated work force
(e.g., Bloom et al. (2009), Hempell and Zwick (2008)), the share of graduates and em-
ployees with a degree higher than apprenticeship as a percentage of the whole employment
(highedu) is integrated. According to Brown, Geddes and Heywood (2007), complemen-
tary HR practices like formal training and incentive pay increase the likelihood of having
employee-involvement schemes9. This can be integrated since the surveys contain infor-
mation about the importance of different forms of transition to flexible working hours
like part-time employment, temporary employment or flexible annual working time. The
questions are answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from no (1) to a very high
importance (5) and are converted to dummy variables which take the value 1 if the im-
portance is 4 or 5, 0 otherwise (parttime01, temp01, flextime01 ).
Additionally, the mode of incentive systems, in particular the use of performance indi-
cators for the determination of wages, is assumed to be related to more decentralized
decision making (Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce (1998), Osterman (1994)). Therefore,
the importance of individual performance, team performance and firm performance for the
determination of the amount of wages is captured in dummy variables. The variables are
again asked on a five-point Likert scale. They take the value 1 if the firms assign a high
or very high importance by choosing the response category 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise (in-
dwage01, teamwage01, firmwage01 ). Also the percentage of employees who participated
in internal or external training (training) is a further variable (Gittleman, Horrigan and
Joyce (1998), Osterman (1994)). Finally, dummy variables for six regions (reg1 -reg6 ),
six sectors (sec1 -sec6 ) and a time dummy (t05 ) are inserted in the equations. Table 1
displays descriptive statistics for the presented variables.
[Table 1 about here]
4.2 Econometric Modeling
As a starting point, a pooled cross sectional OLS regression with cluster robust standard
errors is estimated. Two of the variables, which are used to build the stdict variable, are
9These are in their definition for example autonomous groups, quality circles, joint consultative com-
mittees and task forces.
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lagged (t-1 ) from the surveys 2000 respectively 2005, whereby the problem of reversed
causality is dispelled:
delegationit = β0 + β1stdictit−1 + β2Xit + it, (4)
where delegationit is the dependent variable for the allocation of decision rights, the
variable stdictit−1 indicates the use of ICT and Xit is a vector of the control variables for
firm i at time t to account for observed firm heterogeneity. it is the error term, which is
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and finite variance. In order to gain
efficient and unbiased estimates, the explaining variables must be strictly exogenous and
independent across observations (Greene (2008)).
The panel structure of the data allows to estimate models that account for unobserved
firm characteristics. The estimation model can therefore be written as
delegationit = β0 + β1stdictit−1 + β2Xit + ui. + it. (5)
Panel estimation with random effects uses both between and within variation, but demands
- in order to be unbiased and efficient - that the firm heterogeneity ui is uncorrelated with
the regressors. This assumption is unlikely to be fulfilled: If, for example, certain types of
managers tend to apply a more diverse and intensive use of ICT than other managers and
if the same type of managers likes to decentralize decision-making authority to subordinate
hierarchical levels, then the ICT variable is no longer exogenous to the model, potentially
leading to biased results. Therefore, the results could be under- or overestimated.
As an alternative a fixed effects model can be estimated. This model enables to decrease
the heterogeneity bias and imposes a less strong condition to gain unbiased and efficient
results: The explanatory variables are allowed to be correlated with the time-invariant
part of the error term ui but have to be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term
it. So, they are permitted to be correlated with the unobserved firm specific effects.
However, the fixed effects model requires sufficient level variation within firms in order to
gain reliable results. In the present case, there are several control variables which either
do not change their size or change only little over time, like the founding year (fyear) or
whether the firm is foreign-controlled (foreign). When the within variation is too small,
the results of the fixed effects model might be less efficient because only information within
and not between the group of firms is used. Additionally, due to the elimination of fixed
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effects which are not time-variant, only coefficients of the time-variant variable can be
estimated in this model (Greene (2008)).
Thus, both random and fixed effects models may lead to unreliable results in the present
case. To overcome the above mentioned shortcomings, the Mundlak’s approach (Mund-
lak (1978)) as extension of the random effects model is used aiming at decreasing the
heterogeneity bias. Here it is assumed that included means over the time explain the
correlation between the panel error terms and the explanatory variables (Greene (2008)):
delegationit = β0 + β1stdictit−1 + β2Xit + β3Y i. + ui. + it. (6)
Y i. reflects the averaged time-varying explaining variables for a given firm i. This approach
is used to overcome the respective shortcomings of both random and fixed effects models.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Combined ICT Variables
The central results of the estimated models using the combined ICT variables may be
found in Table 2 (the complete regression outputs with all control variables are displayed
in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). As shown in columns C1 and C5, where the results
of the pooled OLS model are displayed, both ICT variables stdict and stdictcompu have
a positive sign and are significant at the 1% level. The sizes of the coefficients are 0.021
for stdict and 0.022 for stdictcompu. With an F -value of 9.00 and 9.03 and using 1068
observations the whole models are significant at the 1%-level.
[Table 2 about here]
In the next step a random effects model is estimated, which imposes relatively strong
restrictions. Here, no correlation between error term and regressors is allowed in order to
gain consistent and efficient results. As can be seen in columns C2 and C6, the size of the
coefficients slightly decreases to 0.019 and 0.020. Again stdict as well as stdictcompu have
a significant positive impact at a significance level of 1%. According to the Wald Test,
both models are significant at the 1%-level. Note that these results could be biased if the
omitted heterogeneity is correlated with the regressors.
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In the fixed effects model, the unobserved firm characteristics are allowed to be correlated
with the time-invariant part of the error term. Now the results are completely changing
and both ICT variables are loosing its significance (see columns C3 and C7). Compared
to the previous estimations, the R2’s are declining clearly to 0.0052 and 0.0058. Indeed
the complete models are significant, but with very low F-values of 2.11. A reason for this
result could be the much higher between variation compared to the within variation of the
variables. For example, the number of employees (L) has a between variation of 1598.32,
but a within variation of only 226.20. Another example is the variable exportshare, which
has a between variation of 33.58 but a within variation of only 4.77. Therefore, the fixed
effects estimates could suffer from efficiency loss. It seems that the within variation in the
data is too small to explain the degree of delegation using the fixed effects model. These
indicators point that the fixed effects estimation is not the appropriate method to analyze
the impact of ICT on the allocation of decision-making authority in this paper.
Using post estimation tests the appropriateness of both models can be analyzed. The
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects rejects the null hypothesis
of no correlation of the firm-specific effects with the coefficients with Prob> chi2 = 0.000
in models with both variables. However, the Hausman test’s null hypothesis that the
random effects estimator is consistent, is scarcely not rejected with Prob> chi2 of 0.1725
and 0.1449. The hypothesis, that the coefficients of random and fixed effects models are
the same, can therefore not be rejected. Thus, these test statistics do not give a convincing
recommendation for a preferred model.
Due to the characteristics of the data and the related shortcomings of the random and
fixed effects approach, therefore in a last step, the Mundlak‘s approach as extension of
the random effects model is applied. As most striking result the ICT variables stdict
and stdictcompu in C4 and C8 are significant positive on the 1%-level. The size of the
coefficient remains the same compared to the random effects model with 0.019 and 0.020.
This is a slightly decrease in contrast to the pooled OLS model (0.021 and 0.022). Of
the mean variables lny exhibits a significant positive and indwage01 exhibits a significant
negative impact. The Wald test shows that both models are significant on the 1%-level.
Also, the whole model gains a slightly better explanation of the between, within and
overall variation than the random effects model: The R2s show that between (0.2267
and 0.2285) and overall (0.2002 and 0.2020) variation is slightly and within (0.0436 and
0.0422) variation is clearly better explained by the Mundlak‘s model compared to the
original random effects model (R2between: 0.2163 and 0.2181, R
2
overall: 0.1892 and 0.1911,
R2within: 0.0068 and 0.0065). To sum up, the ICT variables stdict and stdictcompu show a
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highly significant positive impact on the degree of delegation using OLS, random effects
and the Mundlak‘s approach.
4.3.2 Combinations of Single ICT Variables
In order to gain further insights about the impact of ICT on the allocation of decision-
making authorities, the effects of the single components of the combined ICT variables
are analyzed separately, in pairs and in a threesome. The empirical investigation follows
the principle of the standardized ICT variables in the previous section: After estimating
pooled OLS, random and fixed effects models in a last step the Mundlak’s approach is
applied. To avoid confusion, only the coefficients of interest with its standard errors are
presented in Table 3. The complete regression results can be found in Table A4 in the
Appendix.
[Table 3 about here]
In short, the share of workers who use computers, internet and intranet (ictshare), the
share of workers who use computers (compushare) and the investments in ICT per capita
(ictpc) show consistent and significant positive impact on the delegation variable in all
equations. The number of ICT (ict) used in the firm has significant positive impact when
included alone and simultaneously with ictpc. Following the Wald test, the null hypothesis
that the models offer no explanation, is rejected on the 1%-level.
These are the results in detail: When included separately, ict, ictshare, compushare and
ictpc have a positive and significant impact on decentralization. Included in pairs, the size
of the coefficients of ictshare and ictpc remains about the same (0.006 and 6.13*10−10).
The size of compushare decreases slightly when included with ictpc (0.017) and ict (0.016).
ict exhibits only significant positive impact at the 5%-level when included with ictpc. It
can be seen, that the explanatory power increases slightly when the variables are included
together.
When all three variables are inserted simultaneously, ictshare, compushare and ictpc are
significant positive at the 1% significance level. The size of ictshare remains with 0.006 the
same, whereas that of compushare decreases very slightly respectively remains the same
with 0.016. Also the sizes of ictpc are about the same with 6.82*10−8 and 6.17*10−10.
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Obviously, ictshare, compushare and ictpc are the driving forces in explaining the positive
impact of ICT on delegation.
All in all, the results confirm the second hypothesis, where the agency costs effect outweighs
the decision information costs effect of ICT which leads to decentralized decision-making
authorities. According to the results, not the variety of ICT, but the diffusion of ICT
within the workforce and the intensity of ICT investments are the central determinants of
decentralization (ictshare, compushare, ictpc). The variety of ICT use (expressed by ict)
shows only in some regressions significant positive impact. As one possible explanation for
this result, the use of advanced ICT (which would lead to a high value of the ict variable
for the firm) are maybe only used from a small fraction of the employees and therefore has
no impact on the overall allocation of decision-making authorities in the firm. In contrast,
it seems likely that a wide diffusion of ICT within the workforce also leads to a general
decentralization of decision rights.
5 Conclusion
In the present paper the relationship between ICT and the allocation of decision rights is
examined using two waves of nationally representative Swiss firm-level panel data. Par-
ticularly, it is analyzed whether ICT is associated with centralization or decentralization
tendencies. Therefore pooled cross sectional, random and fixed effects models are esti-
mated. In the present case, although accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity, these
techniques will potentially not lead to consistent and efficient results. As a compromise
therefore an estimation approach according to Mundlak (1978) is applied additionally. A
further potential estimation bias caused by reversed causality is also taken into account
using lagged ICT variables. Hence, the results are robust to potential endogeneity biases
like reversed causality and unobserved firm characteristics.
The empirical results show a clear association of ICT with decentralization tendencies.
They can be summarized in the following way. First, the use of ICT is generally related
with decentralized decision-making authorities. This confirms the hypothesis where the
effect of lower agency costs seems to outweigh the effect of decreased decision information
costs of ICT and hence fosters decentralization.
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Second, indeed also all single ICT variables show a positive impact on decentralization.
However, the effects of various ICT characteristics differ from each other. The variables
for the share of employees which use ICT and the share of investments in ICT per capita
have the highest fraction to explain the promotion of decentralization. The number of
used ICT shows only some positive impact on decentralization. Thus, first and foremost
the diffusion of ICT within the workforce and the intensity of ICT investments and not
the variety of ICT are essential for the decentralization effect of ICT.
Third, the results do not change significantly using OLS and random effects models and
the Mundlak’s approach. In the present case, unobserved heterogeneity of Swiss firms
apparently does not lead to drastically deviating results compared to the basic OLS re-
gression.
The conclusion of the present paper therefore is, that lower ageny costs due to the use
of ICT result in decentralized decision-making authorities in Swiss firms. It confirms the
results of several previous studies which found a relationship between ICT and organiza-
tional structure. However, it contradicts studies which found evidence for a centralization
effect of ICT. Beyond that, it provides further insights: Firms that let a high share of
their employees participate in ICT use and invest intensively in ICT, give their employees
also more decision-making power. Contrary, the use of advanced ICT is not essential for
decentralized decision-making authorities. Since the development of ICT still goes on, also
the organizational structure will probably be adjusted. Recent trends in ICT like social
networks and instant messenger programms may as well have influence on the allocation
of decision-making authorities in firms in the future.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
delegation 0.34 0.14 0.00 0.79
stdict -0.02 1.01 -2.24 15.70
stdictcompu -0.02 1.02 -2.36 16.38
ict 5.76 1.70 0 8
ictshare 6.42 4.01 0 15
compushare 2.81 1.48 0 5
ictpc 5169.305 87742.82 0 2863300
sales 145,000,000 929,000,000 372,000 19,200,000,000
L 226 571 20 8630
invest 4,235,627 17,100,000 10 372,000,000
fyear 1942 41 1657 2005
foreign 0.16 0.37 0 1
exportshare 25.24 34.58 0.00 100.00
highedu 19.80 17.60 0.00 100.00
parttime01 0.24 0.43 0 1
temp01 0.21 0.41 0 1
flextime01 0.27 0.45 0 1
indwage01 0.87 0.33 0 1
teamwage01 0.28 0.45 0 1
firmwage01 0.48 0.50 0 1
training 29.73 28.78 0.00 100.00
Calculations are restricted to firms which do not provide item
non-response for the subsequent regression analysis of C4 and C5.
The sample size is N = 1068.
Sources: KOF Innovation Panel (waves 2005 and 2008) and the
survey ”Organizational Change and the Adoption of Information and
Communication Technologies” (2000), own calculations.
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Table 2: Regression Results for Combined ICT Variables
Dependent Variable: delegation
Estimation Method: OLS RE FE Mundlak
C1 C2 C3 C4
stdict 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.000 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
C5 C6 C7 C8
stdictcompu 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
lnY 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
lnK 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
lnL -0.038 -0.039
(0.036) (0.035)
exportshare -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
highedu 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
parttime01 0.003 0.002
(0.021) (0.021)
temp01 0.015 0.015
(0.022) (0.022)
flextime01 -0.030 -0.030
(0.019) (0.019)
indwage01 -0.058∗∗ -0.058∗
(0.030) (0.030)
teamwage01 0.033 0.034
(0.021) (0.021)
firmwage01 -0.020 -0.019
(0.017) (0.017)
training 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
stdict
F test/Wald test 9.00∗∗∗ 261.24∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 296.57∗∗∗
R2 0.1900 0.1892 0.0052 0.2002
N 1068 1068 1068 1068
stdictcompu
F test/Wald test 9.03∗∗∗ 261.39∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 294.43∗∗∗
R2 0.1918 0.1911 0.0058 0.2020
N 1068 1068 1068 1068
Legend Coefficient
(standard error)
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level
The standard errors are robust and clusterd by firms.
Sources: KOF Innovation Panel (waves 2005 and 2008) and the survey ”Organizational Change
and the Adoption of Information and Communication Technologies” (2000), own calculations.
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A 1: Description of the Variables
Variable Description
Allocation of Decision-Making Authorities
Allocation of decision rights
(delegation)
Index variable composed of seven questions concering the allo-
cation of decision rights in the firm:
- Who determines the pace of work?
- Who determines the order of tasks to be performed?
- Who distributes the work on employees?
- Who determines the modality of the conducting of the work?
- Who is responsible in case of production difficulties or prob-
lems with the creation of services?
- Who is routinely responsible for customer contact?
- Who is in contact with customers in case of problems or com-
plaints?
Information and Communciation Technologies
ICT (ict) Variable indicating the number of information and communi-
cation technologies applied in a firm (digital assitent, laptop,
internet, local area network, EDI, intranet, extranet, website)
in 2000/2005
Share of ICT usage (ictshare) Variable indicating the share of employees who use computers,
internet and intranet by adding up the diffusion of use of these
technolgies 2000/2005
Share of computer usage (compushare) Variable indicating the share of employees who use computers
2000/2005
ICT investments per capita (ictpc) Variable indicating investments in ICT per capita 2005/2008
stdict (stdict) Variable indicating the diversity, diffusion and intensity of ICT
use in a firm, stdict = std(std(ict) + std(ictshare) + std(ictpc))
stdictcompu (stdictcompu) Variable indicating the diversity, diffusion and intensity of ICT
use in a firm, stdictcompu = std(std(ict) + std(compushare) +
std(ictpc))
Firm Characteristics
Log sales (lnY ) Natural logarithm of a firm’s sales in 2004/2007
Log capital (lnK ) Natural logarithm of a firm’s gross investments in 2004/2007
Log labor (lnL) Natural logarithm of a firm’s number of employees in 2004/2007
Founding year (fyear) Founding year of a firm
Foreign-controlled (foreign) Dummy variable indicating whether or not a firm is foreign-
controlled
Highly educated employees
(highedu)
Share of employees who have an education higher than appren-
ticeship or are graduates
Parttime employment
(parttime01 )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not parttime employ-
ment is important for a firm
Temporary employment (temp01 ) Dummy variable indicating whether or not temporary employ-
ment is important for a firm
Flexible employment (flextime01 ) Dummy variable indicating whether or not flexible employment
is important for a firm
Importance of individual performance for
wage (indwage01 )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not individual perfor-
mance is important for the determination of wages
Importance of team performance for wage
(teamwage01 )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not team performance is
important for the determination of wages
Importance of firm performance for wage
(firmwage01 )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not firm performance is
important for the determination of wages
Training (training) Share of employees who participated in 2004/2007 in internal or
external training
Regional dummies (reg1 -reg7 ) Seven dummies indicating the regional affiliation of the firm
Sector dummies (sec1 -sec7 ) Seven dummies indicating the sector affiliation of the firm
Time dummy (t05 ) Dummy variable indicating the year 2005
Sources: KOF Innovation Panel (waves 2005 and 2008) and the survey ”Organizational Change and the
Adoption of Information and Communication Technologies” (2000), own calculations.
A 2: Complete Regression Results for stdict
Dependent Variable: delegation
Estimation C1 C2 C3 C4
Method: OLS RE FE Mundlak
stdict 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.000 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
lnY 0.010∗ 0.009∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
lnK -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
lnL 0.006 0.007 0.040 0.037
(0.007) (0.007) (0.043) (0.034)
fyear 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
foreign 0.010 0.010 -0.010 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
exportshare 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
highedu 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
parttime01 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.017)
temp01 -0.021∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.029∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
flextime01 0.004 0.008 0.023 0.029∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016)
indwage01 -0.010 -0.009 0.030 0.032
(0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.026)
teamwage01 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.031∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.018)
firmwage01 -0.002 -0.001 0.009 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.015)
training 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
reg1 0.033 0.030 0.026
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
reg2 0.047∗ 0.046∗ 0.046∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
reg3 0.083∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
reg4 0.073∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
reg5 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
reg6 0.093∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Continued on page 33
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Continued from page 32
Dependent Variable: delegation
Estimation C1 C2 C3 C4
Method: OLS RE FE Mundlak
sec1 -0.014 -0.017 -0.018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
sec2 -0.027 -0.033 -0.035∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
sec3 0.039∗ 0.037∗ 0.034
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
sec4 0.046 0.041∗ 0.035
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
sec5 0.030 0.033 0.025
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
sec6 -0.027 -0.030 -0.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
t05 0.008 0.010 0.018 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
lnY 0.042∗∗∗
(0.012)
lnK 0.006
(0.007)
lnL -0.038
(0.036)
exportshare -0.001
(0.001)
highedu 0.000
(0.001)
parttime01 0.003
(0.021)
temp01 0.015
(0.022)
flextime01 -0.030
(0.019)
indwage01 -0.058∗
(0.030)
teamwage01 0.033
(0.021)
firmwage01 -0.020
(0.017)
training 0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.162 0.163 2.174∗∗ 0.165
(0.212) (0.208) (1.055) (0.211)
F test/Wald test 9.00∗∗∗ 261.24∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 2896.57∗∗∗
R2 0.1900 0.1892 0.0052 0.2002
N 1068 1068 1068 1068
Legend Coefficient
(standard error)
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level
The standard errors are robust and clusterd by firms.
Sources: KOF Innovation Panel (waves 2005 and 2008) and the survey
”Organizational Change and the Adoption of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies” (2000), own calculations.
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A 3: Complete Regression Results for stdictcompu
Dependent variable: delegation
Estimation C5 C6 C7 C8
Method: OLS RE FE Mundlak
stdictcompu 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
lnY 0.009∗ 0.009 -0.032∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
lnK -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
lnL 0.008 0.008 0.041 0.039
(0.007) (0.007) (0.043) (0.034)
fyear 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
foreign 0.010 0.010 -0.010 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.012)
exportshare 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
highedu 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
parttime01 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.017)
temp01 -0.021∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.030∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018)
flextime01 0.004 0.008 0.024 0.029∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016)
indwage01 -0.009 -0.009 0.030 0.032
(0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.026)
teamwage01 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.031∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.018)
firmwage01 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.015)
training 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
reg1 0.033 0.030 0.026
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
reg2 0.048∗ 0.046∗ 0.047∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
reg3 0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
reg4 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
reg5 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
reg6 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Continued on page 35
34
Continued from page 34
Dependent Variable: delegation
Estimation C5 C6 C7 C8
Method: OLS RE FE Mundlak
sec1 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
sec2 -0.027 -0.033∗ -0.035∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
sec3 0.037∗ 0.035 0.032
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
sec4 0.047∗ 0.042∗ 0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
sec5 0.026 0.030 0.022
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
sec6 -0.029 -0.032 -0.029
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
t05 0.008 -0.010 0.018 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008)
lnY 0.042∗∗∗
(0.012)
lnK 0.006
(0.007)
lnL -0.039
(0.035)
exportshare 0.000
(0.001)
highedu 0.000
(0.001)
parttime01 0.002
(0.021)
temp01 0.015
(0.022)
flextime01 -0.030
(0.019)
indwage01 -0.058∗
(0.030)
teamwage01 0.034
(0.021)
firmwage01 -0.019
(0.017)
training 0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.174 0.187 2.175∗∗ 0.177
(0.211) (0.207) (1.048) (0.211)
F test/Wald test 9.03∗∗∗ 261.39∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗ 294.43∗∗∗
R2 0.1918 0.1911 0.0058 0.2020
N 1068 1068 1068 1068
Legend Coefficient
(standard error)
***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10%-level
The standard errors are robust and clusterd by firms.
Sources: KOF Innovation Panel (waves 2005 and 2008) and the survey
”Organizational Change and the Adoption of Information and Commu-
nication Technologies” (2000), own calculations.
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d
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